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BLOWBACK THE UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES
OF MILITARY TRIBUNALS
CHARLES V. PENA*
In CIA or "spook" parlance, "blowback" is the unintended
consequences of covert operations. In the 1980s, the United
States supported the Afghan rebels against the Soviet invasion
and occupation because our exclusive focus was the threat of
expansionist Soviet Communism. The CIA took the lead in arm-
ing the Afghans and on the surface the operation was a success.
The Soviet Union-a super power-was expelled, much the
same as the Afghans had expelled the British nearly a century
before. But the CIA aid was almost entirely funneled via Paki-
stan's Inter Services Intelligence agency (ISI). In turn, the ISI
disproportionately funneled hundreds of millions of dollars to
the most Islamist (and pro-Pakistani) factions in Afghanistan,
which turned out to also be the most anti-Western Afghan fac-
tions.1 This gave rise to the Taliban and eventual safe haven for
the training of militants to export jihad and terrorism around the
world-including against the United States on September 11,
2001. Such is the fallout from blowback.
Blowblack is almost as certain as death and taxes, and the
United States needs to be cognizant of the potential downside
consequences-beyond the constitutional and legal questions,
albeit these are of paramount importance-of the special mili-
tary tribunals as authorized by the military order signed by Presi-
dent George W. Bush on November 13, 2001.2
* Charles V. Pefia is a Senior Defense Policy Analyst at the Cato Institute
(www.cato.org), a libertarian public policy think tank in Washington, D.C. He
has analyzed and managed programs and studies on missile defense, strategic
nuclear weapons, targeting policy and strategy, arms control, precision guided
munitions, the future of airpower, long-range military planning, Navy force
structure and costing,joint military exercises, and emergency preparedness and
response. The views expressed are the author's and do not represent the views
of the Cato Institute. The author would like to thank and acknowledge Ms. Kari
Hodges, an intern at the Cato Institute, for her work researching information
and resources for this article.
1. For a more detailed discussion of CIA involvement in Afghanistan, see
PETER L. BERGEN, HOLY WAR, INC.: INSIDE THE SECRET WORLD OF OSAMA BIN
LADEN (2001).
2. See Press Release, White House Office of Press Sec'y, President Issues
Military Order: Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain Non-Citizens in the
War Against Terrorism (Nov. 13, 2001), available at http://www.whitehouse.
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EXTRADITION OF SUSPECTED TERRORISTS
The blowback to the special military tribunals was almost
immediate from the United States' European allies over extradi-
tion of suspected al Qaeda terrorists. To be sure, the European
nations would have concerns even without the prospect of mili-
tary tribunals due to the death penalty in the United States. Arti-
cle 1 of Protocol Number 6 to the European Convention for the
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms states:
"The death penalty shall be abolished. No one shall be con-
demned to such penalty or executed."' And even prior to Sep-
tember 11, the European Union declared its opposition to the
death penalty in all cases and expressed its concern about the
increased use of the death penalty in the United States, particu-
larly during the 1990s.4
But even the European objections to the death penalty
could likely be overcome. According to Francesca Klug of the
Centre for the Study of Human Rights at the London School of
Economics, European rules have not acted as an insurmountable
obstacle to extradition to the United States if the U.S. Attorney
General provides a written declaration that the Justice Depart-
ment does not expect prosecutors to seek the death penalty.
And no defendant sent to the United States under those terms
has been executed.5 For example, on July 19, 2001, France extra-
dited U.S. fugitive Ira Einhorn after the Pennsylvania legislature
passed a law granting him a new trial and assurances that he
would not face the death penalty.6
However, the prospect of special military tribunals con-
ducted in secret that appear to circumvent due process and a fair
trial have created resistance to the possible extradition of dozens
of suspects arrested in Europe since September 11. The original
military order signed by President Bush stated: "[I] t is not practi-
cable to apply in military commissions under this order the prin-
gov/news/releases/2001 /11/20011113-27.html (last visited Feb. 22, 2002)
[hereinafter President Issues Military Order].
3. Protocol No. 6 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights
and Fundamental Freedoms Concerning the Abolition of the Death Penalty,
E.T.S. 114, entered into force Mar. 1, 1985, available at http://conventions.coe.
int/Treaty/en/Treaties/Html/114.htm (last visited Feb. 22, 2002).
4. EUROPEAN UNION, EU MEMORANDUM ON THE DEATH PENALTY (2000),
available at http://www.eurunion.org/legislat/DeathPenalty/eumemorandum.
htm (last visited Feb. 22, 2002).
5. T.R. Reid, Europeans Reluctant to Send Terror Suspects to U.S, WASH. POsT,
Nov. 29, 2001, at A23.
6. Jacqueline Soteropoulos, Einhorn Lawyer Says Extradition Likely to Hap-
pen, PHIL. INQUIRER, July 14, 2001, at A7.
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ciples of law and the rules of evidence generally recognized in
the trial of criminal cases in the United States district courts."7
Therefore, foreign nationals extradited to the United States
could be tried-solely at the discretion of the President-by a
special military tribunal appointed by the Secretary of Defense-
who would set "the rules .... including how many members will
be on the panel, what qualifications they must meet, what stan-
dard of proof will be needed to convict, and what type of evi-
dence can by considered."8 The tribunals could be held in
secret.9 Hearsay could be used as evidence.' ° The defendant
would not have the absolute right to challenge the evidence nor
the right to hear it." The defendant may not have access to legal
counsel of his or her choice.12 Guilt need not be proved beyond
a reasonable doubt. The verdict-even for the death penalty-
need not be unanimous.' 3 And there would be no provision for
judicial review4-only the President or the Secretary of Defense
could overturn a decision.
15
The most immediate case highlighting the problems posed
by the tribunals involved eight alleged al Qaeda terrorists being
held in Spain. Although the United States has not yet asked for
extradition of any of the suspects, a Spanish foreign ministry
spokesman stated that European Union (EU) agreements pre-
vented Spain from extraditing suspects to countries with judicial
norms below those of the EU. Furthermore, Spain would need
to receive assurances that any suspects would not be subject to
capital punishment or military tribunals. 6 Spanish Prime Minis-
terJos6 Marfa Aznar was more vague about the issue, stating after
a meeting with President Bush that "[i]f and when the United
States requests that extradition, we will study it" and that any
7. President Issues Military Order, supra note 2, at § 1 (f).
8. Robert A. Levy, Don't Shred the Constitution to Fight Terror, WALL ST. J.,
Nov. 20, 2001, at A18.
9. See President Issues Military Order, supra note 2, at § 4(c)(1).
10. See id. at § 4(c)(3).
11. See id. at§7(a)(1).
12. See id. at § 4(c)(5).
13. See id. at § 4(c)(6).
14. Id. at § 7(b)(2).
15. Id. at §§ 4(c)(8), 7(a)(2).
16. Spain Concern Over Terror Suspects, CNN.coM, Nov. 24, 2001, at http://
www.cnn.com/2001/WORLD/europe/11/23/inv.spain.extradite/index.html.
(last visited Feb. 28, 2002).
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action on extradition would be taken "with full respect of Span-
ish and United States law.'
17
Subsequently, a more blunt statement was issued by the
European Parliament, which represents the fifteen nations in the
EU: "In adopting this resolution, Parliament emphatically
declared that extradition from the EU to the [United States] can-
not be allowed for people who could be sentenced to death or
who are to be tried by military tribunals."' 8
Thus, the prospect of military tribunals simply adds an
unnecessary potential impediment to the complex process of
extradition, which is already difficult enough. For example, only
after three years of legal delays did Britain's highest court rule
that Khaled al Fawwaz, an alleged al Qaeda leader, and his two
assistants (Ibrahim Eidarous and Adel Abdelbari) could be extra-
dited to the United States on charges that he helped plan the
1998 bombings of two U.S. embassies in Tanzania and Kenya.19
But even with the British ruling that the three al Qaeda suspects
can be extradited, they can still challenge the extradition at the
European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg, which could
add another year or more to the process.
According to the military order, President Bush "deter-
mined that an extraordinary emergency exists for national
defense purposes, that this emergency constitutes an urgent and
compelling government interest, and that issuance of this order
is necessary to meet the emergency."2 ° But ultimately, military
tribunals were seen by the Bush Administration as a means to
expedite the war on terrorism by avoiding potential delays associ-
ated with the civil criminal justice system. According to Bush: "In
a court of law, there would be all kinds of questions that might
compromise our ability to gather incredibly important intelli-
gence to prevent the next attack from happening to America." 1
Defending the use of military tribunals, Attorney General John
Ashcroft said: "Can you imagine the spectacle of capturing a sol-
17. Spain: No Rift Over Terror Suspects, CNN.coM, Nov. 28, 2001, at http://
www.cnn.com/2001/US/11/28/ret.aznar.bush/index.html. (last visited Feb.
28, 2002).
18. European Parliament, European Parliament Daily Notebook, EU
Judicial Cooperation with the United States in Combating Terrorism (Dec. 13,
2001), available at http://www2.europarl.eu.int/omk/OM-Europarl?PROGFC
PRESS-DAILYNB&L&PUBREF//EP//TEXT+PRESS-DAILYNBN-20011213-1+
0tOC+SGML+V0//EN&LEVEL=2&NAV=S (last visited Feb. 25, 2002).
19. T.R. Reid, Britain Approves Suspects' Extradition, WASH. POST, Dec. 18,
2001, at A14.
20. President Issues Military Order, supra note 2, at § l (g).
21. Elizabeth Bumiller with Katharine Q. Seelye, Bush Defends Wartime Call
for Tribunals, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 5, 2001, at Al.
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dier-terrorist in Afghanistan, bringing them back with a publicly
paid, high profile, flamboyant defense lawyer on television, mak-
ing it the Osama network, sending signals to the terrorists
around the country?" 22 But Bush Administration officials may
have miscalculated or underestimated the fallout from the tribu-
nals with the various countries that comprise the coalition in the
war on terrorism. And with al Qaeda cells suspected to be oper-
ating in more than sixty countries, the cooperation of those
countries will be critical to a successful prosecution of the war on
terrorism. In the end, the military tribunals could have the
reverse effect by making it more difficult and time consuming to
extradite suspected terrorists from foreign countries.
MILITARY TRIBUNALS FOR U.S. CITIZENS IN FoREIGN COUNTRIES
If the United States decides to use military tribunals for sus-
pected terrorists, then another possible form of blowback would
be the use of similar tribunals against American citizens in for-
eign countries. Indeed, it would be seemingly hypocritical for
the United States to expect American citizens to be treated
"fairly" abroad (especially by governments with which the United
States has less than friendly relations) if the perception is that
foreign nationals accused of terrorism are being denied due pro-
cess and other basic tenets of a fair trial. This concern is not
unfounded. The U.S. State Department has repeatedly criticized
the use of military tribunals (and similar limitations on due pro-
cess) to try civilians in a number of countries around the world.
Some of the examples cited in the State Department's Country
Reports on Human Rights Practices 2000 3 include:
Burma. Burma is ruled by a highly authoritarian military
regime and the judiciary is not independent of the mili-
tary junta.24 Trials for political cases are not open to the
public and the verdicts are dictated by senior military
authorities.25 Such trials are justified by citing threats to
unity and security2-in other words, much the same rea-
22. Ashcroft Defends Use of Military Tfibunals to Try Terrarists, CNN.coM,
Nov. 21, 2001, at http://www.cnn.com/2001/LAW/1/20/ashcroft.terrorism/
index.html.
23. BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS & LABOR, U.S. DEP'T OF
STATE, COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES 2000 (Feb. 23, 2001),
available at http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2000/ (last visited Feb. 22,
2002).
24. See id. at BURMA, available at http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/
2000/eap/678pf.htm (last visited Feb. 22, 2002).
25. Id. at § I(e).
26. Id.
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sons President Bush has given for the use of special mili-
tary tribunals.
Egypt. In 1992, as a result of extremist violence and under
the auspices of the Emergency Law, Egypt began trying
accused terrorists (and persons accused of belonging to
terrorists groups) in military tribunals. 27 The following
year, the Supreme Constitutional Court ruled that any
crime could be referred to a military tribunal.28 These
tribunals do not ensure civilian defendants due process
before an independent judiciary.29 The Egyptian govern-
ment defends the use of military tribunals as necessary in
terrorism cases, arguing that civilian court trials are pro-
tracted and that judges and their families are vulnerable
to terrorist threats3°-again, much the same arguments
made by the Bush Administration.
" Sudan. Sudan is ruled by a military regime that overthrew
the democratically-elected government in 1989."' The
judiciary is not independent and is largely subservient to
the military regime.2 Although the 1999 Constitution
provides for fair and prompt trials, in practice, military tri-
als can be secret and brief, do not provide procedural safe-
guards, can take place with no advocate or counsel
permitted and do not provide an effective appeal from a
death sentence." The military tribunals proposed by the
Bush administration share some of the same shortcomings
as the tribunals in Sudan that the State Department has
been critical of.
" Peru. Peru uses special military tribunals (established in
1992) to try civilians accused of treason and terrorism. 4
Proceedings in these tribunals (and those for terrorism in
civilian courts) do not meet internationally accepted stan-
dards of openness, fairness and due process.3" Trials can
27. Id. at EGYPT § 1(e), available at http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/




31. See id. at SUDAN, available at http://www.state.gov/g/drl/ris/hrrpt/
2000/af/822pf.htm (last visited Feb. 22, 2002).
32. Id. at §I(e).
33. Id.
34. Id. at PERU §1 (e), available at http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/
2000/wha/827pf.htm (last visited Feb. 22, 2002).
35. Id.
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be held in secret, defense attorneys cannot have access to
the State's evidence files, and they may not question mili-
tary or police witnesses. 6 Peru's use of military tribunals
to try civilians is highlighted by the case of U.S. citizen
Lori Berenson, who was tried and convicted of the terror-
ism-related crime of treason before a military tribunal in
1996 and sentenced to life imprisonment. The State
Department characterized her trial as lacking sufficient
guarantees of due process and having egregious flaws. 37
Berenson was subsequently re-tried, convicted and sen-
tenced to twenty years in prison by a Peruvian civilian
court in June 2001 (but even the re-trial was subject to
criticism about being fair since the Peruvian justice system
does not allow trial by jury and judges are allowed to cross-
examine witnesses)38
Although they were not tried in a military tribunal, the case
of Heather Mercer and Dana Curry in Afghanistan is worth not-
ing. Mercer and Curry were two young American missionaries
with Shelter Now International (a Christian aid group) in
Afghanistan. They were arrested in August 2001 (along with six
other Westerners-four Germans and two Australians-and six-
teen Afghans who worked with the organization) and accused of
promoting Christianity, a crime in the eyes of the ruling Islamic
fundamentalist Taliban regime. They were ordered to stand trial
and faced the death penalty. During the course of Operation
Enduring Freedom-on November 15, 2001-Mercer, Curry,
and the other Western aid workers were freed from a Talibanjail
by a local commander and then ferried out of Afghanistan by
U.S. special operations forces.3 "
In this particular instance, U.S. citizens were actually treated
relatively well. Contrary to Western press reports that demonized
the Taliban, Mercer and Curry claimed that they were treated
with respect and allowed to pray and sing hymns while in jail.4"
But it is not impossible to imagine a different scenario where the
Taliban could have accused Mercer and Curry of being spies or
otherwise supporting the U.S.-led military operations in Afghani-
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. U.S. Woman Convicted in Peru Terror Tria CNN.coM, June 20, 2001, at
http://www.cnn.com/2001/LAW/06/20/berenson/ (last visited Feb. 28,
2002).
39. Rone Tempest & Megan Garvey, Commander Frees Captives, Then U.S.
Ferries Them Out, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 15, 2001, at Al.
40. Douglas Frantz, US. Relief Workers Tell of Fear and Faith, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 17, 2001, at B3.
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stan4 and applied the same standards to them as proposed for
the military tribunals. In which case, instead of a successful res-
cue, the ending to the story could have been two dead American
women.
The point here is very simple: by waving constitutional due
process and other standards of fairness, the use of military tribu-
nals to try accused terrorists in the United States would mean
giving up the moral high ground. According to constitutional
scholar Robert A. Levy at the Cato Institute, the Constitution
"safeguards the personal liberties that sustain a free society, like
the right to due process. The Bill of Rights, after all is more than
scrap paper. And it applies to 'persons,' not just U.S. citizens."42
It would be difficult and hypocritical for the United States to
accuse other countries of subjecting U.S. citizens to unfair trials
if the United States is seen as doing exactly that. Furthermore,
military tribunals might actually encourage or provide an incen-
tive for other countries to do the same. To be sure, a U.S. deci-
sion not to use military tribunals is not a guarantee that other
nations would follow the same example; however, the use of mili-
tary tribunals in the United States would also certainly legitimize
the use of similar proceedings against U.S. citizens overseas.
A WIDESCREEN PERSPECTIVE
From the beginning, President Bush has gone to great
lengths to emphasize that the war on terrorism is not a war
against Islam or Muslims. In his address to Congress and the
American people on September 20, 2001, President Bush said
that the United States respected the Muslim faith and that "l[t] he
enemy of America is not our many Muslim friends. . . . Our
enemy is a radical network of terrorists, and every government
that supports them."4" To avoid the perception of a war against
Islam, the administration initially focused the war on terrorism
on three primary objectives:44
41. Angus Donald & Imre Karacs, Bundled Into a Van, We Lost All Hope. We
Thought We Were Being Taken to be Killed by the Taliban, INDEP., Nov. 16, 2001, at 3,
available at http://www.independent.co.uk/story.jsp?story=105222 (last visited
Feb. 23, 2002). "But the biggest question remaining is: what was Shelter Now
International, a charity supported financially by the United States government,
really doing in Afghanistan?" Id.
42. Robert A. Levy, Tribunals, Trials and Tribulations (Nov. 27, 2001), at
www.cato.org/dailys/11-27-01.html (last visited Feb. 28, 2002).
43. President George W. Bush, Address to ajoint Session of Congress and
the American People (Sept. 20, 2001), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/
news/releases/2001 /09/20010920-8.html (last visited Feb. 22, 2002).
44. See id.
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" Bringing down the Taliban regime in Afghanistan
* Dismantling the al Qaeda terrorist network
* Bringing Osama bin Laden to justice
In the immediate aftermath of September 11, there were
many who called the attacks an attack on the American way of
life, on the very idea of the United States, on American culture,
and on capitalism. In other words, there are those who think the
war on terrorism fulfills Samuel Huntington's prediction of a
"clash of civilizations."4 5 But the reality is just the opposite.
According to Peter L. Bergen, only one of a handful of Western
journalists to have interviewed Osama bin Laden:
In all the tens of thousands of words that bin Laden has
uttered on the public record there are some significant
omissions: he does not rail against the pernicious effects of
Hollywood movies, or against Madonna's midriff, or
against the pornography protected by the U.S. Constitu-
tion. Nor does he inveigh against the drug and alcohol
culture of the West, or its tolerance for homosexuals. He
leaves that kind of material to the Christian fundamentalist
Jerry Falwell, who opined that the September 11 attacks
were God's vengeance on Americans for condoning femi-
nism and homosexuality. If we may judge his silence, bin
Laden cares little about such cultural issues. What he con-
demns the United States for is simple: its policies in the
Middle East. Those are, to recap briefly: the continued
U.S. military presence in Arabia; U.S. support for Israel; its
continued bombing of Iraq; and its support for regimes
such as Egypt and Saudi Arabia that bin Laden regards as
apostates from Islam.4 6
Clearly, bin Laden would like to make his political war
against the United States (which he justifies by his twisted inter-
pretation and understanding of Islam) a larger jihad pitting the
Muslim world against the West. But despite his numerous fatwas
and the attacks on the World Trade Center and Pentagon, bin
Laden has not been able to mobilize the over-one-billion Mus-
lims in the Islamic world to take up arms in a global jihad.
Indeed, his appeal is to a very small radical element in the Mus-
lim world.
The real danger is that the United States-either deliber-
ately or unintentionally-makes the war on terrorism a clash of
45. See SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON, THE CLASH OF CIVILIZATIONS AND THE
REMAKING OF WORLD ORDER (1998).
46. BERGEN, supra note 1, at 222.
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civilizations between the Christian West and the Muslim world. If
Peter Bergen is correct in stating that bin Laden makes the leap
from opposing U.S. policies to killing thousands of innocent
American civilians because "in [bin Laden's] mind the United
States has been equally violent in its treatment of Muslim civil-
ians[,]" 4 then it is paramount not to provide needless fuel for
bin Laden's accusations that the United States is engaged in a
crusade to kill, massacre, and eradicate Muslims. The use of mili-
tary tribunals could give such views some resonance since any
accused terrorists brought before the tribunals are likely to be
Muslim. And if the tribunals are not seen as a fair trial-but sim-
ply as a way to convict and execute Muslims-then bin Laden
could point to them as evidence of his claims against the United
States. The risk to Americans would be that Muslims-moderate
Muslims, Muslims who do not have extreme or radical views,
Muslims who do not have bin Laden's raging hatred of the
United States; in other words, the vast majority of the over-one-
billion Muslims in the world-might be willing to accept bin
Laden's radical views.48
While military tribunals in and of themselves are not likely
to cause such a shift, they could be one of many pieces of the
puzzle that tips the scales. It is important not to underestimate
this possibility. Consider that:
- There are several reports of U.S. mistakes in Afghanistan
that resulted in targeting villages and killing innocent
civilians-all Muslims.4 9 One of the alleged mistakes was a
47. Id. at 99.
48. This hypothetical result is not far fetched. Very early on during the
bombing campaign of Operation Enduring Freedom, when there was criticism
of civilian casualties and uncertainty whether the United States would continue
bombing such that civilian casualties would increase, Ayaz Amri, a columnist for
the Dawn newspaper (Pakistan's most widely circulated English language news-
paper)-and someone speaking as a more moderate Pakistani who agreed with
Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf's decision to support the United States
and who had little sympathy for bin Laden or the Taliban regime in Afghani-
stan-commented:
I'm getting a very uneasy feeling. I was convinced we had done a good
thing, that only a minority favored the Taliban and good riddance.
But now not just the religious extremists, but ordinary Pakistanis, even
English-speaking liberals, are asking why this is happening. Now the
image is no longer the Taliban against everyone, but America mindlessly bomb-
ing a poor country. And the longer this campaign lasts, the stronger and wider
that anger will become.
Pamela Constable, Anti-U.S. Sentiment Spreading in Pakistan, WASH. POST, Oct. 15,
2001, at Al (emphasis added).
49. Susan B. Glasser, "Afghans Live and Die with U.S. Mistakes," WASH.
PosT, Feb. 20, 2002, at Al; Molly Moore, Fleeing U.S. Bombs, Villagers Found No
U.S. airstrike against a convoy that the Pentagon claimed
to be al Qaeda or Taliban, but according to an Afghan
official was tribal delegates coming to Kabul for the instal-
lation of the new interim government.
50
" American troops are accused of beating Afghans captured
in a night raid and mistakenly identified as al Qaeda or
Taliban. 1
" With military operations winding down, American forces
are finding themselves caught between warring Afghan
factions. Underscoring how the war in Afghanistan has
changed from a campaign against al Qaeda and the
Taliban, U.S. forces bombed tribal militias threatening the
stability of the interim Karzai government.
52
" The United States is participating in joint training exer-
cises with the Philippine military to eradicate Abu Sayef, a
militant separatist Islamic group. The U.S. claims that
Abu Sayef is linked to al Qaeda, but any connections are
tenuous and according to Philippine president Gloria
Macapagal Arroyo evidence of al Qaeda in the Philippines
is only up until 1995. 53
" President Bush named two Muslim countries-Iraq and
Iran-as part of an "axis of evil" that threatens the peace
of the world and poses a grave and growing danger in his
State of the Union address.54
So some of the seeds are already sown that could transform the
war on terrorism to a war against Muslims or Islam. The irony
and paradox, of course, would be that U.S. actions and policies
Place to Hide, WASH. POST, Feb. 13, 2002, at Al; Doug Struck, Casualties of U.S.
Miscalculations, WASH. POST, Feb. 11, 2002, at Al; Barry Bearak, Uncertain Toll in
the Fog of War: Civilian Deaths in Afghanistan, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 10, 2002, at 1; Steve
Vogel & Vernon Loeb, U.S. Frees 27 Afghans Held in Raid, WASH. PosT, Feb. 7,
2002, at Al.
50. Afghan Official:U.S. Strike Hits Tribal Delegates, CNN.coM, Dec. 22, 2001,
at http://www.cnn.com/2001/WORLD/asiapcf/central/12/22/ret.afghan.
strikes.convoy/ (last visited Feb. 28, 2002).
51. Vernon Loeb, Alleged Beating of Prisoners Sparks Inquiry, WASH. POST,
Feb. 12, 2002, at A12; Carlotta Gall, Released Afghans Tell of Beatings, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 11, 2002, at Al; Molly Moore, Villagers Released by American Troops Say They
Were Beaten, Kept in "Cage," WASH. POST, Feb. 11, 2002, at Al.
52. Vernon Loeb, Afghan Factions Test U.S. Forces, WASH. PosT, Feb. 21,
2002, at A16; John F. Burns, In a Shi, U.S. Uses Airstrikes to Help Kabu N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 19, 2002, at Al.
53. Lally Weymouth, We Will Do The Fighting WASH. PosT, Feb. 3, 2002, at
B1.
54. Press Release, White House Office of Press Sec'y, President Delivers
State of the Union Address (Jan. 29, 2002), available at http://www.whitehouse.
gov/news/releases/2002/01/20020129-11.html (last visited Feb. 22, 2002).
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cause a chain reaction of events that results in the objective bin
Laden seeks but cannot accomplish on his own.
CONCLUSION
While the initial storm of criticism about military tribunals
cannot be undone,55 the Bush administration appears to have
backed away from its original stance. The first suspect who could
have been tried by a military tribunal-Zacarias Moussaoui, a
French-Moroccan who was arrested in August 2001-was instead
arraigned in a federal district court in Alexandria, VA, where he
will stand trial on six counts of conspiracy related to the terrorist
attacks of September 11 56 And none of the nearly 500 al Qaeda
and Taliban prisoners' being held either in Afghanistan or at
Camp X-Ray in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba have been found by the
Pentagon to be "suitable for the new military tribunals. '5 7 Fur-
ther evidence that the administration may be reconsidering its
original positions on military tribunals is a draft proposal for anti-
terrorism military tribunals leaked to the press at the end of 2001
that calls for imposition of the death penalty only by unanimous
vote, operating largely in public rather than in secret and pre-
sumption of innocence unless proved guilty beyond a reasonable
doubtSS-in other words, much the same standards as a civilian
criminal trial. Interestingly enough, the initial reaction by the
administration to the leak was one of exasperation and to down-
play the reports of the draft proposal,5" even though the changes
to the original November 13 proposal were being viewed in a
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BLOWBACK
positive light and seen to blunt the initial criticisms of military
tribunals.6"
While there are certainly important constitutional and legal
issues regarding military tribunals that cannot and should not be
ignored, the tribunals must also be viewed in the broader context
of whether, on balance, they help or hinder the war on terror-
ism. Therefore, the negative effects and consequences of blow-
back cannot be ignored. The initial damage caused by
proposing military tribunals for suspected terrorists is already
done and there will inevitably be some fallout even if a military
tribunal is never convened. But if the administration persists in
taking a "hard line" on the tribunals, there is likely to be greater
blowback that will cause more harm than good. And the nature
of blowback is that it usually comes at the worst time and in the
worst way.
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